Constitutionalising The Right  to Legal Representation at CCMA Arbitration Proceedings: Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Minister of Labour 2013 1 SA 468 (GNP) by Selala, Koboro J
  
Author: KJ Selala   
 
CONSTITUTIONALISING THE RIGHT LEGAL REPRESENTATION AT CCMA 
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: LAW SOCIETY OF THE NORTHERN 
PROVINCES V MINISTER OF LABOUR 2013 1 SA 468 (GNP) 
 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v16i4.11  
2013 VOLUME 16 No 4 
ISSN 1727-3781 
KJ SELALA                                                                        PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
397 / 487 
CONSTITUTIONALISING THE RIGHT LEGAL REPRESENTATION AT CCMA 
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: LAW SOCIETY OF THE NORTHERN 
PROVINCES V MINISTER OF LABOUR 2013 1 SA 468 (GNP) 
 
KJ Selala
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This case note sets out to re-examine the problems associated with the issue of legal 
representation at arbitration proceedings of the Commission for Conciliation 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). In the recent case of the Law Society of the 
Northern Provinces v Minister of Labour1 (hereafter the Law Society case) the North 
Gauteng High Court, per Tuchten J struck down a rule of the CCMA which limited 
legal representation at proceedings of the CCMA as unconstitutional. Rule 25(1)(c) of 
the CCMA rules restricts legal representation by excluding legal practitioners from 
appearance as of right unless the complex nature of the case is such as to persuade 
the commissioner that the appearance of a legal practitioner is warranted or all 
parties and the commissioner consent to the appearance of the legal practitioner. In 
his judgment Tuchten J found that Rule 25(1)(c) is irrational and arbitrary. The basis 
of the irrationality of the rule, as Tuchten J determined, is rooted mainly in the fact 
of its inconsistency with section 3(3)(a) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act (PAJA).2 Tuchten J noted that while section 3(3)(a) of PAJA empowers the 
administrator to exercise discretion to give a person whose rights are materially and 
adversely affected by administrative action an opportunity to obtain legal 
representation both in serious and in complex cases, Rule 25(1)(c) does not, as does 
section 3(3)(a) of PAJA, confer the discretion on the commissioner in a CCMA 
arbitration to afford the opportunity for legal representation in a serious but not 
                                                 
  Koboro J Selala. BIuris, LLB, LLM (UNIN). Lecturer, School of Undergraduate Studies, Northwest 
University, Mafikeng Campus. Email: 22013113@nwu.ac.za. 
1   Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Minister of Labour 2013 1 SA 468 (GNP) (Law Society 
case). 
2  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). Section 3(3)(a) of PAJA states: "In 
order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair  administrative action, an administrator may, 
in his or her or its discretion, also give a person  referred to in subsection (1) an opportunity 
to – (a) obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal representation." 
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complex case of dismissal for misconduct or incapacity. In so deciding Tuchten J 
disagreed with an earlier decision of the Labour Appeal Court in Netherburn 
Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Robert Mudau NO,3 (hereafter 
Netherburn Engineering case) where the Labour Appeal Court found that the 
seriousness of a dismissal does not in itself justify the conclusion that the limitation 
of legal representation at CCMA is irrational. In the latter case Musi JA had found 
that section 140(1)4 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) was rational.5 
  
This case note aims in the main to analyse critically the judgment of Tuchten J in the 
Law Society case and to consider its implications for labour dispute resolution in 
South Africa. Two factors in particular appear to have influenced the court in its 
decision: firstly, the reasons advanced by the respondents to justify the rule: and 
secondly the apparent discrepancy in wording between Rule 25(1)(c) and section 
3(3)(a) of PAJA. The case note considers first if Tuchten J was correct in his 
approach to finding that Rule 25(1)(c) is irrational. Secondly, Tuchten J's finding that 
Rule 25(1)(c) is inconsistent with section 3(3)(a) of PAJA is considered. It is argued 
that while Tuchten J's findings in this matter may appear at first glance to be 
uncontroversial, a careful study of the judgment shows that the judgment was not 
properly considered, and leaves much to be desired. It is asserted that although our 
law does not recognise an absolute right to legal representation at labour 
proceedings, in the light of Tuchten J's judgment, it will not be easy to identify the 
circumstances that would provide justification for the infringement of the right to 
                                                 
3  Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Robert Mudau 2009 30 ILJ 269 (LAC) 
(Netherburn Engineering case). 
4  Before its repeal by s 28 of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 12 of 2002 (LRA), s 140(1) of 
the LRA provided as follows: "If the dispute being arbitrated is about the fairness of a dismissal 
and a party has alleged that the reason for the dismissal relates to the employee's conduct or 
capacity, the parties, despite section 138(4), are not entitled to be represented by a legal 
practitioner in the arbitration proceedings unless - 
 (a) the commissioner and all the other parties consent; or 
 (b) the commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to expect a party to deal with the dispute 
without legal representation, after considering - 
 (i)   the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute; 
 (ii)  the complexity of the dispute; 
 (iii) the public interest; and 
 (iv) the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their representatives to deal with the 
arbitration of the dispute." 
5  Netherburn Engineering case para 32 of Musi JA's judgment. 
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legal representation at CCMA arbitrations, and probably at internal disciplinary 
hearings as well. The case note does not enter the debate about whether or not 
legal representation is desirable at CCMA proceedings, but will note the profound 
implications of the judgment on the whole of labour dispute resolution in the 
country.  
 
2 The facts and the decision of the Court 
 
The Law Society of the Northern Provinces (the Law Society) brought an application 
to declare Rule 25(1)(c) of the rules of the CCMA unconstitutional.6 The thrust of the 
Law Society's argument was that Rule 25(1)(c) is irrational and arbitrary. As the Law 
Society argued, the basis of the irrationality lies in the fact that Rule 25(1)(c) does 
not affect the rights conferred in Rule 25(1)(b)7 in relation to the other categories of 
representatives but only legal practitioners as defined are affected. In its submission, 
the Law Society contended that there is no reasonable or constitutional rationale 
why only practising legal practitioners have a qualified right to appear in dismissal 
disputes involving conduct or capacity.8 
  
The application was opposed by the Minister of Labour and the CCMA (hereafter the 
respondents). In their opposition, the respondents argued that the system within 
which the CCMA functions is the product of a negotiation by a variety of social and 
                                                 
6  Rule 25(1)(c) states: "If the dispute being arbitrated is about the fairness of a dismissal and a 
party has alleged that the reason for the dismissal relates to the employee's conduct or capacity, 
the parties, despite subrule (1)(b), are not entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in 
the proceedings unless - 
 (1) the commissioner and all the other parties consent; 
 (2) the commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to expect a party to deal with the dispute 
without legal representation, after considering - 
 (a) the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute; 
 (b) the complexity of the dispute; 
 (c) the public interest; and 
 (d) the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their representatives to deal with the        
dispute." 
7  Rule 25(1)(b) provides that in any arbitration proceedings, a party to the dispute may appear in 
person or be represented only by: - 
 (1) a legal practitioner; 
 (2) a director or employee of that party and if a close corporation also a member thereof; or 
 (3) any member, office bearer or official of that party's registered trade union or registered 
employer's organisation. 
8 Law Society case para 25. 
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legal partners.9 They stressed that these negotiating partners had agreed that 
arbitration litigants should enjoy an unqualified right to legal representation in all 
arbitrations other than those concerning dismissals for misconduct or incapacity. The 
CCMA specifically argued that "it is inherent in the structure of the adjudication of 
disputes by the CCMA that disputes about whether individuals or groups of 
employees have breached company rules or are incapacitated to an extent that 
justifies their dismissal are less serious, are regulated by a detailed code of practice, 
and should be adjudicated swiftly and with the minimum of legal formalities".10 
However, Tuchten J was not impressed by this explanation, stating that dismissal is 
a serious matter. Although he remarked that in a great number of cases the 
employee's job will be his major asset, Tuchten J conceded that the evidence of the 
respondents concerning the nature of the system within which the CCMA functions 
was also compelling.11 However, Tuchten J indicated that while he is mindful of the 
balance which must inevitably be present in our system of workplace dispute 
regulation, any such balances which are translated into legislation or administrative 
action must pass constitutional muster.12 
 
Accordingly Tuchten J turned to consider the constitutional and legal framework 
pertaining to Rule 25(1)(c) of the CCMA rules. He compared the provisions of Rule 
25(1)(c) with section 3(3)(a) of PAJA. He noted that while section 3(3)(a) of PAJA 
empowers the administrator to exercise discretion to give a person whose rights are 
materially and adversely affected by administrative action an opportunity to obtain 
legal representation both in serious and in complex cases, Rule 25(1)(c) does not, as 
does section 3(3)(a) of PAJA, confer the discretion on the commissioner in a CCMA 
arbitration to afford the opportunity for legal representation in a serious but not 
complex case of dismissal for misconduct or incapacity.13 A plain consideration of 
these provisions compelled the court to conclude that Rule 25(1)(c) is inconsistent 
with the "Constitution "to the extent that it significantly abridges the discretion of 
the commissioner in a CCMA arbitration to afford the opportunity for legal 
                                                 
9  Law Society case para 28. 
10  Law Society case para 28. 
11  Law Society case para 28. 
12  Law Society case para 30. 
13  Law Society case para 39. 
KJ SELALA                                                                        PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
401 / 487 
representation in a serious but not complex case of dismissal for misconduct or 
incapacity".14 Tuchten J held that Rule 25(1)(c) also impermissibly trenches upon the 
discretion conferred by section 3(3)(a) of PAJA in relation to serious cases.15 
 
Following up on the above analysis, Tuchten J considered the effect of the earlier 
judgment of the Labour Appeal Court in the Netherburn Engineering case on the 
case before him. In that case Musi JA had found that section 140(1) of the LRA was 
rational.16 In an attempt to clarify this apparent contradiction, Tuchten J pointed out 
that these two cases are distinguishable. What distinguishes the two cases, as 
Tuchten J reasoned, was that in the Netherburn Engineering case, Musi JA was 
dealing with a statutory provision contained in national legislation, the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA),17 the effect of which was that the provisions of section 3(3)(a) 
of PAJA were not required in that context to be observed.18 As Tuchten J eloquently 
reasoned, had the substance of Rule 25(1)(c) been contained within the LRA itself, 
"there would have been room for the argument that the provision in the LRA was 
inconsistent with PAJA, with the consequence that there was no requirement that 
the LRA be read together with PAJA for present purposes".19 But because, "as 
matters stand today, that is not the case, the result is that to achieve constitutional 
compliance, the impugned subrule must be consistent with both the LRA and 
PAJA".20 
 
In the final analysis, Tuchten J declared Rule 25(1)(c) to be unconstitutional for 
want of rationality, but the order was suspended for 36 months to allow the CCMA 
to formulate a new rule. Tuchten J remarked, though, that his finding of 
constitutional invalidity in respect of Rule 25(1)(c) does not mean that the rules of 
the CCMA must provide for an unrestricted right to legal representation. On the 
contrary, he pointed out, both the common law as expressed in the case of Hamata 
                                                 
14  Law Society case para 39. 
15  Law Society case para 39. 
16 Netherburn Engineering case para 32 of Musi JA’s judgment. 
17  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
18 Law Society case para 37. 
19  Law Society case para 16. 
20  Law Society case para 16. 
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v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee21 (hereafter 
Hamata) and section 3(3)(a) of PAJA confer a discretion on a commissioner in a 
CCMA arbitration.22 However, as will be shown below, it is difficult to conceive of 
situations where the envisaged "new rule" would adequately regulate legal 
representation at the CCMA without taking away the discretionary powers conferred 
on commissioners. 
 
3 Evaluation of and comment on Law Society of the Northern 
Provinces v Minister of Labour 
 
This judgment raises at least two interrelated questions concerning the right to legal 
representation at labour proceedings. The first question relates to the constitutional 
status of the right - that is, whether the right to legal representation has, in the light 
of Tuchten J's judgment, assumed the status of an absolute right at these 
proceedings. The flip side of that question is whether or not the common law 
principle concerning legal representation at administrative tribunals has lost its 
relevance in labour disputes. The second question concerns the implications of the 
judgment on the future exercise of discretionary powers by presiding officers at 
disciplinary hearings or on the discretionary powers of CCMA commissioners to allow 
or deny legal representation in misconduct cases or unfair dismissal disputes. In 
other words, given the fact that a dismissal of an employee is a "serious matter", as 
Tuchten J determined, is it easy to conceive of a situation where the discretion 
would be exercised against allowing legal representation in misconduct cases or 
unfair dismissal disputes without rendering such a decision unconstitutional? These 
questions are fully considered below. Firstly, the Court's finding that Rule 25(1)(c) is 
irrational is critically analysed. Secondly, Tuchten J's interpretation of section 3(3)(a) 
of PAJA in relation to Rule 25(1)(c) is also examined. 
 
There are also few other issues which give this case significance. These issues are 
highlighted later in this paper. 
                                                 
21 Hamata v Chairperson Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee 2002 5 SA 445 
(SCA). 
22  Law Society case para 43. 
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3.1 The Court's finding that Rule 25(1)(c) is irrational 
 
3.1.1 The Court's approach 
 
In his approach Tuchten J began by noting that "the best way to determine if a 
decision is rational is to examine it in the light of the reasons advanced to justify the 
decision".23 But as soon as Tuchten J had set out this approach problems began to 
emerge. Firstly Tuchten J was confronted with the reality that the rationality or 
otherwise of the rule did not hinge on the mere explanations advanced by the 
respondents but was rooted in the LRA itself. Secondly, Tuchten J was also 
confronted with a situation concerning the decision of the Labour Appeal Court in 
the Netherburn Engineering case. In an attempt to circumvent these hurdles 
Tuchten J sought to decide the rationality question by looking at the construction of 
the impugned subrule in comparison with the relevant provision of PAJA. By taking 
this route Tuchten J jettisoned his initially intended approach and in the process 
evaded the main question of rationality. It is submitted that Tuchten J should rather 
have sought first to understand the rationale of the Rule 25(1)(c) with reference to 
the real reasons for the existence of the rule. These reasons are contained in both 
the Explanatory Memorandum of the draft LRA24 and the LRA itself. 
 
In the Explanatory Memorandum of the draft LRA Bill, the following was stated:25 
 
Legal representation is not permitted during arbitration [concerned with 
dismissals for misconduct and incapacity] except with the consent of the 
parties. Lawyers make the process legalistic and expensive. They are also 
often responsible for delaying the proceedings due to their unavailability and 
the approach they adopt. Allowing legal representation places individual 
employees and small business at a disadvantage because of the cost. 
 
The need for expeditious, informal and affordable procedures that take place before 
accessible and specialist dispute resolution institutions has been accepted as the 
                                                 
23  Law Society case para 27. 
24  Explanatory Memorandum of the Labour Relations Bill (1995) ILJ 278. 
25  Explanatory Memorandum of the Labour Relations Bill (1995) ILJ 278 319. 
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underlying reason for the limitation of legal representation at the CCMA.26 As 
Professor Van Eck noted, these reasons were also relied on when the CCMA and the 
Labour Court were established shortly after South Africa became a constitutional 
democracy in 1994.27 Despite some strong views which had been expressed against 
the limitation of legal representation after the establishment of the CCMA, the 
restrictive measures have merited general approval.28 In this regard, mention might 
be made of the failed attempts to declare the restrictive measures unconstitutional 
on one or more grounds including that of irrationality. 
 
In Norman Ntsie Taxis v Pooe NO29 an argument was raised suggesting that the 
rationale for excluding legal representation in certain arbitration proceedings had 
fallen away, and that the initial objectives recorded in the Explanatory Memorandum 
could no longer be used as a basis for determining the legitimacy of any exclusion or 
limitation of the right to legal representation in the CCMA.30 In dismissing this 
argument Van Niekerk J indicated that the starting-point in any evaluation of "these 
submissions" is the nature and status of the CCMA. 
 
The CCMA is not a court of law… Although the CCMA may make awards that 
may be financially onerous on the parties to arbitration proceedings and 
while the nature of arbitration proceedings before the CCMA may resemble 
that adopted in a civil court, the fact remains that the CCMA is an 
administrative agency, at most in some instances a statutory tribunal, which 
in the discharge of its various statutory functions is required, inter alia, to 
arbitrate and determine those disputes in respect of which it has 
jurisdiction.31 
 
Similarly, Zondo JP, in dismissing the constitutional challenge against section 140(1) 
of the LRA, held in the Netherburn Engineering case:32 
                                                 
26  Benjamin 1994 ILJ 260; Van Eck 2012 TSAR 775. 
27 Van Eck 2012 TSAR 775. Benjamin, for example, held the view that there are strong indications 
that a high degree of legal representation "…would both undermine endeavours to resolve these 
disputes expeditiously and tilt the balance unfairly in the favour of employers" (Benjamin 1994 
ILJ 260). 
28 See, for example, Buirski 1995 ILJ 529, quoted in Collier 2003 ILJ 754. 
29  Norman Ntsie Taxis v Pooe 2005 26 ILJ 109 (LC). 
30  Norman Ntsie Taxis v Pooe 2005 26 ILJ 109 (LC) para 38. 
31 Norman Ntsie Taxis v Pooe 2005 26 ILJ 109 (LC) para 40. 
32 Netherburn Engineering case para 44 of Zondo JP judgment. 
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[T]o the extent that the Act provides for legal representation in certain 
arbitrations but does not treat arbitration proceedings relating to dismissals 
for misconduct equally or in the same way, there is justification for such 
limitation. Those cases in which the Act may be providing for a right to legal 
representation are different from cases of dismissal for misconduct. Anyone 
who has had anything to do with our labour law and the dispute-resolution 
system in the labour field will know that by far the majority of cases that 
affect employers and employees and that “consume” public resources are 
dismissal cases and most of the dismissal cases are those relating to 
dismissal for misconduct. The legitimate government purpose in relation to 
the provision of compulsory arbitration under the Act was to provide a 
speedy, cheap and informal dispute-resolution system. If you failed to 
achieve that goal in regard to disputes concerning dismissals for misconduct, 
you would never achieve that goal in respect of the entire Act. 
 
This view of Zondo JP was further buttressed in a separate but concurring judgment 
of Musi JA where it was held that if the exclusion of legal representation was meant 
to achieve the legitimate government purpose of providing for the speedy, cheap 
and informal resolution of disputes, then it made sense to confine it to the majority 
of the cases.33  
 
It is important to mention that the dispute in the Netherburn Engineering case did 
reach the Constitutional Court which, unfortunately, declined the invitation to rule on 
the constitutionality of the repealed section 140(1) of the LRA.34 The Constitutional 
Court pointed out that a ruling on the constitutionality of the repealed section 140(1) 
would have no relevance to the constitutionality of the CCMA Rule 25(1). As the 
Constitutional Court crisply put it, “the question of the constitutionality and meaning 
of CCMA rule 25 thus stands over for another day”.35 
 
  
                                                 
33 Netherburn Engineering case para 43 of Musi JA judgment. 
34  Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Mudau 2009 30 ILJ 1521 (CC). 
35  Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Mudau 2009 30 ILJ 1521 (CC).para 13. 
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3.1.2 The distinction between the Netherburn Engineering and the Law Society 
cases 
 
It has been said earlier that in his judgment Tuchten J sought to distinguish the Law 
Society case from the Netherburn Engineering case. However, given the sameness 
of the principle, which is the rationality of the exclusion of legal representation at 
CCMA arbitration, and the legal questions involved in both cases, this distinction is, 
with respect, too convenient and is hard to sustain. It is argued that given the test 
of rationality as enunciated in the various Constitutional Court judgments36 referred 
to in the Netherburn Engineering case,37 as entailing that there must be a rational 
connection between the challenged provision and the achievement of a legitimate 
government purpose, it makes little difference if the challenged principle, in this 
context the limitation on legal representation, is contained in a statute or a CCMA 
rule. In this respect, it is difficult to agree with the narrow distinction which Tuchten 
J sought to draw between the Netherburn Engineering case and the Law Society 
case. It is also both significant and startling that Tuchten J failed to consider any of 
the abovementioned authorities.  
 
On a proper reading of his judgment, Tuchten J sought to question the wisdom of 
the drafters of the LRA for restricting legal representation at the CCMA but in the 
process disturbed a settled legal position.38 This much appears from the following 
passage of the judgment:39 
 
[I]t is in my view a fair conclusion that the several negotiating parties who 
participated in the deliberations that led to the enactment of the LRA came 
to a compromise solution in relation to legal representation at arbitrations 
which found its way into the now repealed ss 138(4) and 140(1) of the LRA 
and ultimately into subrules 25(1)(b) and (c). I am mindful of the subtle 
balances that must inevitably be present in our system of workplace dispute 
regulation. But of course any such balances which are translated into 
                                                 
36 New National Party of SA v Government of the Republic of SA 1999 3 SA 191 (CC) para 19; 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of SA 2000 2 SA 
674 (CC) para 85; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) para 74. 
37  Netherburn Engineering case para 43 of Musi JA judgment. 
38  This legal position is neatly captured in the Netherburn Engineering case paras 14-18 and 32. 
39  Law Society case para 34. 
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legislation or administrative action must pass constitutional muster. An 
administrator as that term is used in PAJA has a discretion under s 3(3)(a) to 
give a person whose rights are materially and adversely affected by 
administrative action an opportunity to obtain legal representation both in 
serious and in complex cases. 
 
On this path Tuchten J found himself unable to avoid the temptation to attack Musi 
JA's judgment in the Netherburn Engineering case, as he stated:40 
 
[T]he learned judge of appeal found that a commissioner could routinely 
determine before the arbitration started whether legal representation was 
appropriate. I respectfully disagree. It fairly frequently happens that a case 
which appears before it starts to be straightforward turns out to be complex. 
The learned judge further concluded that it was rational to make the 
distinction because dismissals based on misconduct and incapacity constitute 
by far the bulk of the disputes arbitrated by the CCMA. Again, I respectfully 
disagree. To identify one category of case a priori (by reasoning from 
assumed axioms) for different treatment irrespective of the merits of each 
individual case seems to me the essence of arbitrariness. 
 
The inevitable consequence of this approach was that Tuchten J would find himself 
sitting as a court of appeal against the decision of the Labour Appeal Court in the 
Netherburn Engineering case. This approach is surely legally unbearable primarily 
because it offends the principle of stare decisis.41 One might, of course, argue that 
Tuchten J was justified in questioning the logic in Musi JA's reasoning regarding the 
latter's conclusion that a commissioner could routinely determine before the 
arbitration started if a matter is complex or not. However, such criticism is hardly 
sustainable considering the informal nature of the CCMA process and the active 
participation of the parties before and during the arbitration hearing. In other words, 
the CCMA commissioner could always enquire informally from the parties what the 
salient issues of the dispute are and in the process be able to determine the proper 
route to follow, including whether or not to permit legal representation in the 
circumstances. Therefore, it would not be correct to assume that a commissioner 
cannot determine the complexity of a matter right at the beginning of the arbitration 
hearing. 
                                                 
40  Law Society case para 36. 
41  On the importance of the principle of stare decisis see Ncukaitobi 2012 Acta Juridica 148, and 
the authorities cited therein. 
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While legal representation is undoubtedly advantageous and desirable in any forum 
that resolves disputes by the application of law, it does not necessarily follow that 
legal representation before these forums is absolute.42 This position was 
authoritatively clarified in Hamata, where the Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
there is no constitutional right to legal representation before tribunals other than 
courts of law.43 Furthermore, as Musi JA percipiently noted in the Netherburn 
Engineering case, it cannot be said that parliament was not aware of the sorts of 
criticism raised against the limitation of legal representation at CCMA hearings when 
it passed the LRA.44 In a similar spirit Langa CJ in a minority judgment in Chirwa v 
Transnet45 sounded the following warning:46 
 
[W]hile we may question [that] intention and may have preferred a 
legislative scheme that more neatly divided responsibilities between the 
different courts, that is not the path the legislature has chosen. We must be 
careful as a court not to substitute our preferred policy choices for those of 
the legislature. The legislature is the democratically elected body entrusted 
with legislative powers and this Court must respect the legislation it enacts, 
as long as the legislation does not offend the Constitution. 
 
Although the case of Chirwa v Transnet did not deal with the same issues as those 
raised in the Law Society case, it is submitted that the warning sounded by Langa CJ 
therein is equally instructive to the present matter. Exclusion of legal representation 
at the CCMA is a policy issue which the courts cannot help but respect, as long as it 
does not offend the Constitution.47 As will become apparent from the discussion 
below regarding the interpretation of section 3(3)(a) of PAJA, the restrictive measure 
contained in Rule 25(1)(c) does not, arguably, offend the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
42  Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee 2002 5 SA 445 
(SCA) para 11; MEC: Department of Finance, Economic Affairs & Tourism, Northern Province v 
Mahumani 2002 5 SA 449 (SCA) para 11; Majola v MEC, Department of Public Works, Northern 
Province 2004 25 ILJ 131 (LC). 
43  Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee 2002 5 SA 445 
(SCA) para 11. 
44  Netherburn Engineering case para 32 of Musi JA's judgment. 
45  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 4 SA 367 (CC). 
46  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) para 174. 
47  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) para 174. 
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From the analysis of Tuchten J's reasoning concerning the question of the rationality 
of Rule 25(1)(c), it does appear that Tuchten J attached excessive weight to the 
enquiry about whether Rule 25(1)(c) was consistent with section 3(3)(a) of PAJA. 
This approach, it is respectfully submitted, contributed significantly to the Court’s 
losing its necessary focus on the substantive issues to be considered in the 
judgment.48 It is submitted that had Tuchten J sought to understand properly the 
rationale of Rule 25(1)(c) with reference to its historical background and also 
considered the practical implications of granting an absolute right to legal 
representation at the CCMA, he would surely not have arrived at the decision he 
arrived at. To this extent, it is submitted that Tuchten J should have approached the 
constitutionality of Rule 25(1)(c) with much more caution.  
 
3.3 The Court's finding that Rule 25(1)(c) is inconsistent with section 
3(3)(a) of PAJA 
 
At the outset it is important to bear in mind that the CCMA rules were promulgated 
against the background of a particular regulatory scheme, namely that established 
by the LRA. Section 115(2A) of the LRA empowers the CCMA to establish rules to 
regulate practice and procedures during conciliation and arbitration proceedings.49 
Rule 25 in particular was introduced to deal with representation as contemplated by 
section 115(2A)(k).50 These rules were intended not only to facilitate processes at 
CCMA but also, quite importantly, to advance the objectives of the LRA in so far as 
resolving disputes speedily, cheaply and informally.51 
 
                                                 
48  According to applicant's submissions, the main issue before court was the rationality of Rule 
25(1)(c) of the CCMA Rules, the determination of which depended, in the words of Tuchten J, on 
the reasons advanced to justify the decision. However, it is interesting to note that in his 
judgment Tuchten J considered it unnecessary to consider the applicant's grounds of contention 
about the rationality of Rule 25(1)(c) in the light of his finding that Rule 25(1)(c) is inconsistent 
with section 3(3)(a) of PAJA. Law Society case para 42. 
49  See section 115(2A)(a) of the LRA. 
50  Section 115(2A)(k) of the LRA provides that the Commission may make rules regulating to - (k) 
the right of any person or category of persons to represent any party in any conciliation or 
arbitration proceedings. 
51  See the Explanatory Memorandum of the Labour Relations Bill 1995 ILJ 278. 
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In order to determine if Tuchten J was correct in his finding that rule 25(1)(c) is 
inconsistent with section 3(3)(a) of PAJA, it is important to take a closer look at the 
construction of both provisions. 
 
Section 3 of PAJA, in general, provides for minimum requirements of procedural 
fairness. Section 3(1) requires that all administrative action must, in order to be 
valid, be procedurally fair. Section 3(2)(b), in particular, provides for the following 
minimum requirements for procedural fairness:52 
 
(a) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed 
administrative action; 
(b) reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
(c) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
(d) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where 
applicable; and 
(e) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5. 
 
Section 3(3)(a) provides for legal representation in certain instances. According to 
Plasket section 3(3)(a) comes in handy when the minimum requirements set out in 
section 3(2)(b) are insufficient to attain procedural fairness.53 For this reason, 
administrators are granted discretion to allow a person to be assisted or legally 
represented, in serious or complex cases, to “present and dispute information and 
arguments” and to appear in person before the administrator concerned.54 
 
As indicated earlier, in his judgment Tuchten J held that Rule 25(1)(c) is inconsistent 
with section 3(3)(a) of PAJA. He reasoned that while section 3(3)(a) of PAJA 
empowers the administrator to exercise discretion to give a person whose rights are 
materially and adversely affected by administrative action an opportunity to obtain 
legal representation both in serious and in complex cases, Rule 25(1)(c) does not, as 
does section 3(3)(a) of PAJA, confer the discretion on the commissioner in a CCMA 
arbitration to afford the opportunity for legal representation in a serious but not 
                                                 
52  On the analysis of s 3 of PAJA, see Plasket Administrative Action 9. 
53  Plasket Administrative Action 10. 
54 Plasket Administrative Action 10. 
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complex case of dismissal for misconduct or incapacity.55 Implicit in this argument is 
the proposition that in the absence of the word “serious” in Rule 25(1)(c), Rule 
25(1)(c) is inconsistent with section 3(3)(a) of PAJA. However, it is respectfully 
submitted that Tuchten J misread or alternatively failed to interpret the provisions of 
section 3(3)(a) of PAJA properly. Section 3(3)(a) of PAJA confers the discretion to 
allow legal representation in serious “or” complex cases. It is submitted that the use 
by the legislature of the word “or” in section 3(3) is not without significance. In 
other words, the word “or” in section 3(3)(a) may not be interpreted to mean, for 
example, “and”. Literally interpreted, the word means what it means, that is, either 
one of the two. Also, it does not appear from the context that the legislator could 
have intended any other meaning than the simple dictionary meaning of the word. 
In Commissioner, SARS v Executor, Frith's Estate56 the SCA pointed out that in the 
interpretation of a statute, the golden rule of interpretation of statutes is that where 
the meaning of words is clear the courts must give effect to their ordinary meaning. 
As the SCA in that matter also cautioned, this must, however, be done within the 
context of the statute. Given its interpretive importance, the word "or" in section 
3(3)(a) of PAJA could surely not have been chosen by mistake. In contrast, Rule 
25(1)(c) does not contain in its formulation both the words "serious” and “complex", 
but only "complex". Arguably, the lawmaker sought to distinguish the two provisions 
both in terms of meaning and purpose. This argument is fortified by what Musi JA 
stated in the Netherburn Engineering case:57 
 
[I]n my view, the answer to the contentions around the gravity and 
complexity of individual unfair dismissal disputes, has been provided by the 
amici curiae. The issue is not the gravity of the consequences of the 
dismissal but rather the complexity thereof. This is so because dismissal will 
always entail adverse consequences for the employee, in particular. It is the 
nature and complexity of the issues, both of fact and of the law involved, 
whether the issues implicate the public interest and the comparative ability 
of the parties or their representatives adequately to deal with the issues that 
inform the decision whether to permit legal representation. 
 
                                                 
55  Law Society case para 39. 
56 Commissioner, SARS v Executor, Frith's Estate 2001 2 SA 261 (SCA) 273. See also Poswa v 
Member of the Executive Council of Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism, Eastern Cape 
2001 3 SA 582 (SCA) para 10. 
57  Netherburn Engineering case para 30 of Musi JA's judgment. 
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Considering the formulation of the two respective provisions, both in structure and 
purpose, it is fair to conclude that Rule 25(1)(c) is not inconsistent with section 
3(3)(a) of PAJA. In the circumstance, it is again respectfully submitted that Tuchten 
J erred in finding that Rule 25(1)(c) is inconsistent with section 3(3)(a) of PAJA. 
 
4 Legal representation under common law and the Constitution in a 
nutshell 
 
Under common law, there is no general right to legal representation at tribunals 
other than courts of law. Numerous authorities supporting this principle are 
summarised and discussed by Buchner in his LLM thesis.58 According to these 
authorities, the right to legal representation arises if the administrator in the exercise 
of his discretion considers it just and equitable to allow it.59 As a general rule, the 
common law affords a party a fair opportunity to present his or her case (audi 
alteram partem principle). However, this does not necessarily imply that the right to 
legal representation is included within the framework of the audi alteram partem 
principle.60 
 
For a variety of historical and, perhaps, political reasons the full rigour of the 
common law has been tempered by legislative and constitutional interventions which 
in diverse ways protect employees from untrammelled managerial power. As Marais 
JA percipiently observed in Hamata:61 
 
[T]his constitutional and statutory position comes as no surprise. There has 
always been a marked and understandable reluctance on the part of both 
legislators and the Courts to embrace the proposition that the right to legal 
representation of one's choice is always a sine qua non of procedurally fair 
administrative proceedings. However, it is equally true that with the passage 
of the years there has been growing acceptance of the view that there will 
                                                 
58 Buchner Constitutional Right to Legal Representation 23-37. 
59  See for example Morali v President of the Industrial Court 1986 7 ILJ 690 (C); Lace v Diack 1992 
13 ILJ 860 (W); Yates v University of Bophuthatswana 1994 3 SA 815 (B); Lunt v University of 
Cape Town 1989 2 SA 438 (C); Administrator, Transvaal v Zezile 1991 1 SA 21 (A). 
60 Dabner v SA Railways and Harbours 1920 AD 583. See also Baxter Administrative Law 252, 
quoted in Buchner Constitutional Right to Legal Representation 36. 
61  Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee 2002 5 SA 445 
(SCA) para 11. 
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be cases in which legal representation may be essential to a procedurally fair 
administrative proceeding. 
 
In the considered observation of O'Regan J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs,62 in the current constitutional dispensation, the continuing 
relevance of the common law would have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, in labour law, the continued vitality of the common law principle against the 
automatic right to legal representation is now manifested in both the LRA and PAJA, 
as illustrated by numerous decisions of our courts.63 The argument was succinctly 
put by Musi JA in Netherburn Engineering, where he stated as follows:64 
 
At common law the basic requirement for the conduct of proceedings before 
statutory bodies and domestic tribunals is that there must be conformity 
with the principles of natural justice to ensure procedural fairness. The issue 
of legal representation is regulated by whatever statute, regulation or rule 
that may be applicable, which may allow or preclude it. Where it is neither 
allowed nor prohibited, the tribunal has a discretion to allow it in appropriate 
circumstances. In short, there is no absolute right to legal representation…65 
Under the Constitution it is imperative to allow for flexibility so that tribunals 
are vested with a discretion to permit legal representation in appropriate 
circumstances where legal representation is necessary in order to ensure 
procedural fairness and that a rule that prohibits the exercise of a discretion 
cannot pass muster under the Constitution. 
 
In a nutshell, the current legal position regarding legal representation is that there is 
no constitutional right to legal representation in labour proceedings. In these 
proceedings the presiding officers or CCMA commissioners are given latitude to 
                                                 
62  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 22. 
63  MEC: Department of Finance, Economic Affairs & Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani 2002 
5 SA 449 (SCA) para 11; Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary 
Committee 2002 5 SA 445 (SCA) para 11; Norman Ntsie Taxis v Pooe 2005 26 ILJ 109 (LC); 
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 2 BCLR 158 (CC). The adoption of the LRA in 
1996 in particular introduced a new era in labour law. One of the stated aims of the new system 
is to give effect to the provisions of the Constitution. As Professor Van Eck (Van Eck 2012 TSAR 
774) noted, with the LRA, policy-makers sought to limit the presence of legal representatives 
during specified labour dispute resolution processes. Indeed, as Wallis (Wallis 2005 Law, 
Development and Democracy 188) has also observed, “the acceptance of the common law and 
its rules in these areas does not mean that it reigns supreme over our labour law or that the LRA 
is subordinate to its dictates”. 
64  Netherburn Engineering case para 15 of Musi JA's judgment. 
65  Netherburn Engineering case para 14 of Musi JA's judgment. 
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exercise their discretion to either allow or deny legal representation in accordance 
with the rules and the Constitution. 
 
Be this as it may, already in Lace v Diack and Others,66 Van Zyl J indicated that while 
the current position was that there was no absolute right to legal representation in 
our law, the time might well come when public policy might demand the recognition 
of such a right. Van Zyl J indicated that our law has not developed to the point 
where the right to legal representation should be regarded as a fundamental right 
required by the demands of natural justice and equity.67 
 
5 The potential impact of the Law Society judgment on labour dispute 
resolution 
 
On a practical level, the Law Society case has the potential to significantly impact on 
labour dispute resolution in the country at large. If the inclusion of the word 
"serious" is what Tuchten J envisages in the "new rule" which the CCMA has been 
directed to redraft, then the implications will be far reaching, considering that all 
dismissal cases are serious. Any discretion against allowing legal representation at 
the CCMA, or disciplinary hearings for that matter, will be effectively eroded. 
 
Although it is not certain at this stage what form the new rule would have to take to 
be constitutionally compliant, it is assumed that the CCMA would replicate the 
provisions of section 3(3)(a) of PAJA into the new rule. Considering what Tuchten J 
said about dismissal being a serious matter, the effect of this new rule would then 
be that the right to legal representation would be absolute in all unfair dismissal 
cases before the CCMA. This position would certainly be at odds with the vision and 
objectives of the drafters of the LRA, which were to make labour dispute resolution 
                                                 
66  Lace v Diack 1992 13 ILJ 860 (W). 
67  The case of the Law Society seems to suggest that the time referred to by Van Zyl J in Lace v 
Diack, when public policy might demand the recognition of the absolute right to legal 
representation has arrived. This can be inferred from Tuchten J's finding that dismissal is a 
serious matter and that Rule 25(1)(c) of the CCMA rules is therefore inconsistent with PAJA. 
Hence, with respect, Tuchten J's judgment does not support discretion for CCMA commissioners 
in unfair dismissal cases and cannot be claimed as authority for the view that there is no 
absolute legal representation at labour tribunals under South African law. 
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informal, speedier and cost-effective. Quite critically, Tuchten J's judgment would 
have effectively overruled the long-standing authority of the Labour Appeal Court,68 
the Supreme Court of Appeal69 and the Constitutional Court70 regarding the 
constitutional status of the right to legal representation at administrative tribunals. If 
the CCMA were to promulgate the new rule as directed by the court, the effect 
thereof would be felt not only by the CCMA but also by employers at large. As long 
as the seriousness of dismissal is viewed as critical, legal representation would be an 
absolute right which might not be denied under any circumstance. This would 
overlap with all serious misconduct cases at internal disciplinary hearings. The 
practical consequence would surely be something never envisioned by the drafters 
of the LRA and employers at large. 
 
It is extremely unfortunate that on such an important issue as legal representation, 
Tuchten J did not fully appreciate the implications of his judgment on the entire 
labour dispute resolution system in the country. Arguably, of course, Tuchten J did 
pay some attention to the potential impact of his judgment on future dispute 
resolution by the CCMA in general, and the workload that would likely be created for 
the CCMA in particular. In this regard Tuchten J was quick to dismiss any such 
concerns holding that employees are entitled to assert their rights. "If by so doing a 
greater volume of work is generated for the CCMA, then the State is obliged to 
provide the means to ensure that constitutional and labour law rights are protected 
and vindicated".71 
 
As indicated earlier, Tuchten J suspended the order of constitutional invalidity for a 
period of 36 months to allow the CCMA to draft a new rule. The effect of this 
suspension is that until such time as the new rule is put in place, the current rule will 
continue to be in force. Theoretically speaking, the CCMA Commissioners should in 
the meantime continue to exercise their discretion to either allow or deny legal 
representation in unfair dismissal cases. It is, however, difficult to imagine how the 
                                                 
68  Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Robert Mudau 2009 30 ILJ 269 (LAC). 
69  Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee 2002 5 SA 445 
(SCA). 
70  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 2 BCLR 158 (CC). 
71  Law Society case para 40. 
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commissioners would exercise such discretion against allowing legal representation 
in the face of Tuchten J's judgment. 
 
6 The significance of Law Society of the Northern Province v Minister 
of Labour 
 
It is widely accepted that the right to legal representation is an essential right in any 
legal system that prides itself on being fair and democratic. In this respect the Law 
Society case reinforces the importance of lawyers in a constitutional democracy.72 
Indeed, as argued by Buirski some years ago, the ability of a lawyer to delineate 
what may otherwise be a complex legal and factual issue and his role in acting as a 
check on the administrative process should never be underestimated.73 
 
It is also worth noting that Tuchten J's judgment raises an important policy 
consideration that points in favour of a finding that legal representation must be 
absolute. Admittedly though, however desirable legal representation may be, it is 
not the path chosen by the legislature or the drafters of the LRA. And as argued 
earlier, it could not have been the intention of the lawmaker to grant absolute right 
to legal representation at CCMA arbitration in misconduct and incapacity disputes 
considering the applicable legal framework and the rationale for that decision as 
shown above. 
 
At the end of the day it is a question of policy; the legislature will have to weigh the 
disadvantages of prohibiting legal representation with the alleged advantages of 
cheap, non-legalistic and expeditious proceedings.74 
  
                                                 
72  On the importance of representation in general see Grogan Dismissal 238. 
73  Buirski 1995 ILJ 529. 
74  Buchner Constitutional Right to Legal Representation 58. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
In the foregoing discussion it has been shown that the decision of the court in Law 
Society v Minister of Labour is controversial. The analysis of the judgment reveals 
that the discretion vested in the CCMA commissioners to permit or deny legal 
representation to a party in an unfair dismissal dispute has indeed been taken away 
and that such a party is entitled as of right to legal representation regardless of 
whether anyone objects or not. Although this note is critical of the court for not 
appreciating the practical implications of its judgment on the operations of the CCMA 
and labour dispute resolution at large, it is not suggested here that the judgment is 
wholly amiss. Although not the best of judgments, Tuchten J's decision in Law 
Society has set a precedent and arguably opened the door for South African courts 
to develop the existing right to representation properly.  
 
It is also evident from the foregoing discussion that the right to legal representation 
at administrative tribunals is an evolving area of law. In spite of the failure of the 
drafters of the Constitution to include the right in the Constitution, the courts are 
recognising that in certain specific circumstances legal representation at 
administrative tribunals may be necessary to ensure that the principles of 
fundamental justice are respected. However, while the right to legal representation 
may be crucial in underpinning broad structures of employee representation at either 
the CCMA or a domestic disciplinary hearing, legal representation, in itself, is not 
guaranteed to moderate the outcomes of the enquiry. 
 
In conclusion, it all boils down to the interpretation of section 3(3)(a) of PAJA 
against Rule 25(1)(c) of the CCMA rules. What and how the amended or new Rule 
25(1)(c) will look like, and whether it will adequately protect the constitutional rights 
of parties remains to be seen. 
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